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Although private forest use in Brazil has been regulated at least since the Forest Code of 1965, 
cumulative deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon reached 653,000 km2 by 2003 (INPE 2004). Much of 
this deforestation is illegal. In 1999, the State Foundation of the Environment (FEMA) in Mato Grosso 
introduced an innovative licensing and enforcement system to increase compliance with land use 
regulations.  If successful, the program would deter deforestation that contravenes those regulations, 
including deforestation of riverine and hillside forest (permanent preservation areas), and reduction of a 
property’s forest cover below a specified limit (the legal forest reserve requirement).   
This study seeks to assess whether introduction of the program affected landholder behavior in the 
desired direction. Simple before/after comparisons are not suitable for this purpose, because there is 
considerable year to year variation in deforestation due to climatic and economic conditions.   Nor is it 
valid to assess program impacts by comparing licensed and unlicensed landholders, even though the 
program focused its enforcement efforts on the former.  This is because, first, landholders with no 
intention of deforesting may choose to become licensed; and second, unlicensed landholders may be 
deterred from deforestation by the mere existence of a serious program that aims for universal licensing. 
To meet these challenges, the study applies a difference-in-difference approach to geographically 
explicit data.  It looks for, and confirms, post-program declines in deforestation in high-priority 
enforcement areas  relative to other areas; in more easily observed areas relative to less easily observed 
areas; in areas of low remaining forest cover (where further deforestation is probably illegal) relative to 
high remaining forest cover. Thus, even against a backdrop of higher aggregate deforestation (driven in 
part by higher agricultural prices), there is evidence that the program in its early stages (before 2002) did 
shift landholder behavior in a direction consistent with reduced illegal deforestation. (The legality of 
deforestation was not however directly observed).  We hypothesize that this behavioral change resulted 
from an initial perception of increased likelihood of the detection and prosecution of illegal 
deforestation, following announcement of the program.  The study does not assess SLAPR impacts 
following the change of state administration in 2003.   
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Brazilian federal policy emphasizes the importance of restraining illegal deforestation, as part of 
the overall goal of encouraging sustainable development in the Brazilian Amazon (Presidência 
da República 2004). Over the past 15 years, federal and state agencies have put in place a variety 
of legal and administrative instruments to regulate land and forest use in Amazônia.  Yet 
deforestation of the tropical forest has continued, more or less unabated (see Figure 1), and an 
even greater proportion of the cerrado (savanna woodland) has been cleared.   Much of this 
deforestation contravened two important requirements of the 1965 Forest Code.  The Code 
requires each landowner to maintain reserva legal (RL: legal forest reserve) of 50% (later 80%) of 
each property under natural vegetation (in Amazônian forest areas), or 20% (later 35%) in 
Amazônian cerrado (savanna) areas. The Code also requires maintenance of areas de preservação 
permanente (APPs: permanent preservation areas) near rivers, on slopes and on hilltops.  It places 
limits on the sum of APP and RL areas; in Amazônian cerrado, for instance, the sum cannot 
exceed 50% of the property. 
The difficulty in enforcing regulations reflects several challenges.   First, there is a strong 
economic incentive driving much deforestation (Margulis 2004).   Second, there is a huge area 
to monitor.  Third, while penalties for illegal deforestation were substantially increased in 1998, 
landholders may perceive a low probability that the long chain of detection, arraignment, 
prosecution, and judgment will result in an effective penalty (Akella and Cannon 2004; Hirakuri 
2003).  In other words, the perceived deterrent may be low.   
For these reasons, there has been great interest in Mato Grosso’s new system for environmental 
regulation (SLAPR), which deploys technological and institutional innovations to address these 
challenges.   
On its introduction, the SLAPR was greeted enthusiastically and was credited with contributing 
to a reduction in Mato Grosso’s state-wide deforestation rate. However, there has subsequently 
been a dramatic rise in the Mato Grosso deforestation rate, in absolute terms and relative to  
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other Amazônian states.  What do these aggregate deforestation rates tell us about the system’s 
overall effectiveness? 
This paper argues that simple before-program/after-program comparisons do not provide a 
measure of program effectiveness, because commodity prices, weather, and other factors 
strongly influence year-to-year variation in deforestation rates.  Comparisons between 
deforestation inside vs. outside licensed properties are also problematic guides to effectiveness, 
because early volunteers for licensing may be systematically different in characteristics or 
motivation from their more reticent neighbors.   Moreover, while we recognize that the 
program prioritized its enforcement efforts on licensed properties, we hypothesize that it may 
also have affected behavior in the unlicensed areas.  This is because credible operation of the 
program within the licensed properties might increase the perceived probability of eventual 
detection and punishment of unlicensed activities. 
The paper therefore reviews the methodological challenges in assessing program impact.   It 
then proposes a solution, based on an innovative application of the difference-in-difference 
approach to geographically explicit data.  We hypothesize that the program, if successful, will 
have a differentially large impact on three types of areas: 
•  those explicitly targeted for higher enforcement effort 
•  areas that are more easily observed, e.g. on very large properties 
•  areas where most deforestation is likely to be unauthorizable, e.g. in contravention of the 
  forest reserve requirement.  
Using multivariate analysis that holds constant a variety of factors, we find that deforestation in 
each of these areas declined, relative to other areas, after the program was instituted.  The period 
of analysis however extends only through 2002, and cannot be generalized to the subsequent 
period.  Starting in 2003 there was a change in state administration, with the governorship 
passing from an environmental advocate to one of the world’s largest soybean farmers.    
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The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section describes the Environmental Control 
System and reviews the broad deforestation trends since its introduction. Section 3 discusses 
methodological difficulties in assessing program impact and proposes a conceptual framework 
and econometric test for addressing these issues, looking at post program changes in 
deforestation differentials across the landscape.  The following section describes the data.  The 
‘difference-in-difference’ predictions are then examined via simple crosstabulations in section 5 
and subjected to formal multivariate statistical tests in section 6.   Section 7, a digression, looks 
at spatial variation in land values as an important factor in understanding the pressures for 
deforestation.  The paper concludes with a brief summary.   
1  FEMA’s Environmental Control system  
In 2000, FEMA (the Mato Grosso state environmental agency) implemented an improved rural 
environmental control system (State of Mato Grosso 2001), sometimes called SLAPR (an 
acronym for Rural Property Environmental Licensing System).  Licensing, although prominent, 
is only one component in an integrated system.  
The goal of the system is to “enforce current environmental legislation as simply and as 
inexpensively as possible” with particular focus on enforcing RL and APP requirements, 
enforcing rules on forest and field burning, and ensuring that all land use activities are 
appropriately licensed.3  Cost-effectiveness results from the use of remote sensing (satellite 
imagery) to monitor large areas for deforestation and illegal forest burning; the use of GIS 
(geographic information systems) to manage data on licensed properties; and a focus on 
properties of greater than 1000 hectares, since these are relatively few in number but control 
most privately owned land and are presumed responsible for the bulk of deforestation.  
                                                 
3  The following description of the system is based largely on State of Mato Grosso (2001), from which the quote 
was taken.  
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FEMA has a multipronged approach to encouraging compliance with land use regulations: 
deterrence of deforestation on nonlicensed properties; encouragement of landowners to license 
their properties; and enforcement of regulations on licensed properties.  In the first prong, 
satellite and field inspections of high deforestation areas identifies landowners who are out of 
compliance with regulations.  Many of these, especially in the early phases of implementation, 
will have unlicensed properties.  These violators are subject to severe civil and criminal 
penalties.  However, FEMA’s preferred approach is offer a  reduction of up to 90% in fines if 
they repair the damage done to RL or APP areas.  This is done through the licensing process.  
Landowners may also voluntarily opt to license their properties, motivated in some cases by 
lenders’ requirements to show compliance with regulations. 
In either case, recruitment of a property into licensed status facilitates enforcement of 
regulations.  A first step in the licensing process involves detailed mapping of the property, and 
determination of compliance with RL and APP requirements. Landowners who are out of 
compliance are given an opportunity to redeem themselves by reestablishing native vegetation, 
by purchasing a compensating area of RL from another private property, or by purchasing for 
the state a private property within an already-gazetted conservation unit. Landowners who are 
already in compliance may apply for an authorization for legally compliant deforestation.  
Because the maps of licensed properties are stored in a GIS, subsequent violation of license 
terms can in principle be easily and unambiguously detected.  Moreover, the owners of licensed 
properties are legally bound to observe the licensing terms, so that violation of these terms 
exposes them in principle to swift and severe penalties.  
Initial studies of the environmental control program suggested that it was contributing to an 
observed reduction in aggregate deforestation.   FEMA credited the control system with the 
decrease in deforestation rates (per total area) from 2% in the biennium 1998-994 to 1.35% in 
the biennium 2000-01 (FEMA 2002, 19). Fearnside’s municipal-level study of FEMA’s data for 
                                                 
4  That is, the two year period ending in April 1999.  
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1998-99 and 2000-01 found a larger decrease in deforestation for municipalities with high 
enforcement activities (Fearnside 2002, 2003). 
Subsequently, however, the deforestation rate in Mato Grosso increased.  INPE estimates for 
Mato Grosso (which, unlike FEMA, cover only the forest biome, excluding the cerrado)5  
depict an 8.5% decrease in 1999-2000, a 20.9% increase in 2000-01, a 1.6% decrease in 2001-02 
and a 27.2% increase in 2002/03.  Figure 1 shows that the recent uptick in Mato Grosso 
deforestation contrasted with a downward trend elsewhere in the Amazon.   
 
Figure 1: Deforestation in the Legal Amazon 1989-2003 (Source: INPE-Prodes 2004) 
 
Does this mean that the environmental control program was initially effective and then lost its 
effectiveness?  Not necessarily.  Deforestation rates are driven by climatic and economic forces 
that vary sharply across space and time.  For instance, deforestation is more likely when soil 
moisture is low, because this decreases the cost of clearing and increases the likelihood of 
                                                 
5  See Fearnside and Barbosa (2004).    
9
accidental (escaped) forest fires (Nepstad et al. 1999).  Hence there is a strong relation between 
the El Niño cycle and deforestation.  There is also a strong presumption that deforestation 
responds to the prices of agricultural commodities associated with forest and savanna 
conversion, especially beef and soybeans.  The nominal price of beef approximately doubled 
between 1998 and 2003 due largely to an abrupt decline in the exchange rate; at the same time, 
Mato Grosso was declared free of aftosa (food and mouth disease) opening up export options 
(Kaimowitz et al. 2003).   This combination of factors could well account for the sharp rise in 
Mato Grosso deforestation.   
In sum, simple before versus after assessments of deforestation do not provide insight into 
program effectiveness – a common difficulty in the evaluation of any public policy that affects 
behavior over a large region.  The next section considers this problem and suggests a solution. 
2  Assessing program impacts on deforestation: methodological issues  
2.1  A typology of deforestation 
How might the Environmental Control System affect landholder behavior and deforestation?  
To think about this, it is helpful to distinguish, conceptually, three types of deforestation: 
1.  non-authorized, non-authorizable (NN) deforestation.  This comprises actions, such as 
deforestation of APPs, or reduction of RL below the legal limit, which would ordinarily not 
be licensed. 
2.  non-authorized, authorizable deforestation (NA).  This class of deforestation includes all 
deforestation which meets the criteria for a deforestation authorization, but was illegal 
because the landowner did not in fact apply for or receive a license.     
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3.  authorized, authorizable deforestation (AA).  This includes all deforestation for which an 
official authorization was granted. (We assume that all authorized deforestation is also 
authorizable, ie that authorities correctly interpret and apply existing regulations.) 
If successful, the SLAPR would be expected to reduce NN-type deforestation, in absolute 
terms.  It would not necessarily reduce the total amount of authorizable deforestation (the sum 
NA+AA) – it might even increase it, as NN-deforesters shifted to AA.  However, the program 
would be expected to shift NA-type to AA-type.  Hence we predict that a successful program 
would reduce the ratio NN/(NA+AA) and the ratio NA/(NA+AA). 
How might the program accomplish this?  There are two avenues.  First, the agency might 
directly target some landowners for recruitment into the system, i.e. licensing.  Once licensed, 
these landowners will in principle face large, immediate penalties for noncompliant (NN) 
deforestation, but no penalties for AA deforestation.  Second, program implementation may 
also affect the behavior of unlicensed landholders.  These landholders must weigh the costs and 
benefits of undertaking unlicensed deforestation.  Even though the program is less able to 
detect and punish illegal behavior outside licensed properties, unlicensed landholders may 
decide that NN-type deforestation has become riskier now that the program is in operation.  
They may respond either by entering the system; shifting to NA-type deforestation; or trying to 
conceal NN deforestation by undertaking it in less detectable locations. 
2.2  Defining and detecting program impact on deforestation 
This typology suggests that the program could be evaluated for its impact on three different 
measures of deforestation: total deforestation (NN+NA+AA), illegal deforestation (NN+NA), 
or unauthorizable deforestation (NN).   While all are of potential interest, in this paper we 
focus on NN.  In our view, this is the most policy-relevant measure of environmental impact, 
since NN-type deforestation is by definition the least desirable.  The NA-to-AA shift, in 
contrast, is essentially a relabeling of deforestation.  If successful, the relabeling would reflect a  
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successful extension of the rule of law with important long-run impacts (in reducing future 
NN-type deforestation) but would not have any immediate environmental implications.  
A second and more profound problem is controlling for other factors, besides the introduction 
of the program, which may affect deforestation.  The problem here is lack of a good control 
area against which to compare the outcome of the state-wide experiment.  As noted above, it is 
uninformative to compare pre-program and post-program deforestation rates, because of 
confounding factors. It is tempting to propose a comparison between the deforestation rate on 
licensed vs. unlicensed properties.  But this comparison falls far short of the ideal of comparing 
a treatment vs. a control group.  The problem is that licensed properties may differ from 
unlicensed properties in many ways – some unobservable.  In particular, it is possible that the 
earliest volunteers for licensing were those with no plans for deforestation.  This includes 
properties with no pressure or plans for forest conversion.  It also includes properties where 
most forest was long ago converted, and whose prosperous owners now seek rapidly to achieve 
compliance status through compensation.6  So, to take some extreme but illustrative scenarios:  
•  Suppose licensed properties consist only of those who had no plans for deforestation.  In 
this case, the measured rate of deforestation rate on the licensed properties would be 
much lower than that of nonlicensed properties – but licensing (by assumption) had no 
behavioral effect. 
•  Suppose that all landowners who planned NA (non-authorized but authorizable) 
deforestation obtain licenses and carry out AA deforestation instead; meanwhile 
surveillance discourages most NN deforestation outside licensed properties.  In this case, 
the program in fact successfully discouraged illegal deforestation, but measured rate of 
deforestation on licensed properties is much higher than on unlicensed properties. 
                                                 
6  The state offered these property owners incentives to exercise the compensation option as soon as possible.  
The ratio of required compensation area to past RL loss was scheduled to rise from 1 in 2001 to 5 in 2005.  
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These problems are, in theory, surmountable.  The econometric solution requires: 
1.  data on the licensing status and deforestation behavior of individual landholders 
2.  data on variables that influence the landholder’s decision on whether or not to license, but 
arguably have no effect on the decision whether or not to deforest.  This would allow us to 
analyze natural experiments in the effect of licensing on deforestation.  In other words, it 
would allow us to match ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ cases.7 
In general, it is difficult to find variables that meet criterion 2.  Even without them, however, 
we could look at the pre-program determinants of deforestation, and the post-program 
determinants of licensing, and thus determine whether licensees are mostly those with low or 
high deforestation risk. 
2.3  A difference-in-difference approach 
Unfortunately, property level data on licensing is not available to us, and indeed we do not even 
have maps of property boundaries.  So we propose a different approach to detecting overall 
program impacts on deforestation behavior.  Let us distinguish between ‘high cover’ and ‘low-
cover’ areas. High-cover areas are lands (outside protected areas) in which local forest cover 
(computed as a moving average) exceeds the applicable RL limit, and low-cover areas constitute 
the remainder on non-protected lands.  Deforestation rates may systematically differ between 
high-cover and low-cover plots of land, even after controlling for observable determinants of 
deforestation risk, such as road proximity and slope.  There are a variety of reasons for this 
differential, which could work in either direction.  Low cover areas may be more attractive for 
deforestation -- that is why they have already lost their cover.  On the other hand, it may be 
                                                 
7  For instance, suppose we thought that there was no difference between landholders with pre-program loans 
from banks that enforce the Protocolo Verde, vs. landholders with pre-program loans from other banks.  But 
maybe those with loans from Protocolo Verde banks have a greater incentive to get licensed.  So we could 
match treatment-control pairs of landholders between PV and non PV banks.  We would hypothesize no 
difference in deforestation before SLAPR, but a large difference afterwards.  Similarly, we may compare 
adjacent properties on different sides of the Mato Gross/Pará state border, hypothesizing that they are 
identical save for the state laws they face.  
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that in low cover areas, the only remaining forest patches occupy poor soils unattractive to 
farmers or ranchers (Chomitz et al, 2005).   
How will this differential between high and low cover areas change with the advent of the 
Environmental Control System?  The low cover areas are much more likely to be in violation of 
the RL requirement.  (This is a statistical assertion, since we do not observe the actual 
compliance status of any point.)  If the program is effective in deterring type NN deforestation, 
then we would expect a decline in the deforestation of low cover areas relative to high cover.  In 
other words, we expect the differential to change after the program is introduced.  This is a 
variant of the difference-in-difference approach widely used in program analysis.  However, this 
is the first application of which we are aware for geographically explicit data. 
Formally, let 
yit= deforestation rate, plot i, time t 
Xit= characteristics of plot i at time t 
LOWCOVERit = 1 if plot is  low cover at time t, =0 else 
POSTPROGRAMt=1 if  program is operational at time 1, =0 else 
μt be a year-specific effect 
We can model the deforestation rate as: 
(1) yit= Xitβ + γ LOWCOVERit+δ(POSTPROGRAMt* LOWCOVERit) + μt 
This equation is consistent with a standard spatial model of deforestation (see e.g. Chomitz and 




given the assumed high correlation between LOWCOVER and noncompliance with RL.   
We use this general framework to test several hypotheses about program impacts.   For 
instance, we can examine the relative impact of the program in areas targeted for more 
intensive enforcement, using an ENFORCEMENT dummy variable in place of the 
LOWCOVER: 
(2)  yit= Xitβ + γ ENFORCEMENTit+δ(POSTPROGRAMt* ENFORCEMENTit) + μt 
Here we predict γ>0  (because priority enforcement areas were chosen on the basis of high 
observed deforestation rates, but again expect δ<0. 
We assert that, if successful, the program will be observed to reduce deforestation in: 
•  low-cover areas relative to high-cover areas 
•  areas prioritized for enforcement relative to others 
•  APP areas relative to non APP areas 
•  areas close to roads (these being more observable and targeted for greater levels of 
enforcement) relative to far from roads. 
We stress again that these comparisons are not simple differences, but rather, differences in 
differences. 
We also hypothesize that the program will have differentially greater impact on large-patch 
deforestation relative to small-patch deforestation, for two reasons.  First, large patches are 
more easily detectable by remote sensing and might be supposed to attract greater attention 
from the authorities.  Second, large-patch deforestation characterizes large properties, which 
were the explicit focus of the Environmental Control System.  Next we describe our study area,  
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our approach to analyze program effectiveness, the available data sets and our data sampling 
technique. 
3  Methodology 
3.4  Study area and time period 
With about 906,000 square kilometers, Mato Grosso is the third largest federal state of the 
Legal Amazon and Brazil. It is located in the center-west region of the country and has parts of 
three major ecoregions: Amazon moist forests (52%), “Cerrado” savanna woodlands (41%) and 
“Pantanal” wetlands (7%) (FEMA 2002, 6). All of them are considered to be globally 
outstanding and of high conservation priority. Yet they are threatened by agricultural 
expansion, road construction, water projects and pollution (Dinerstein et al. 1995). 
Colonization of Mato Grosso started already in the 1950s and 1960s when extensive tracts of 
land were sold for large-scale cattle-ranching projects to entrepreneurs from southern Brazil. 
Induced by the growth-oriented policies of the 1970s and the export-oriented policies of the 
1980s, soybean production expanded rapidly throughout the cerrado of Mato Grosso, making 
the state Brazilian’s largest soybean producer in the 1990s. In 1995, 24.9% of Mato Grosso was 
used for agricultural purposes, primarily for large-scale pasture (57.7%) and large-scale annual 
crop cultivation (18.8%). Less than a quarter of the agricultural land was used for subsistence 
agriculture (13.9%) in 1995 (SEPLAN 2002). In contrast to some other parts of the Amazon, 
the colonization process of the Mato Grosso was dominated by private large-scale 
entrepreneurs who are perceived to be the greatest contributors to deforestation in Mato 
Grosso. In 1996/97, 62.4% of the total deforestation patches monitored by FEMA were 
greater than 200 hectares (FEMA 2002).  
Although the program was announced  in 1999, licensing activities began in 2000, accelerating 
in 2001 and especially 2002.  We expect therefore increased program credibility and deterrent  
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effect after 1999.  Hence we compare FEMA deforestation rates from periods prior to program 
implementation (1996-97; 1998-99) with post-program FEMA data (2000-01; 2002). Since 
FEMA enforcement targets private rural properties, our analysis extent was limited primarily to 
non-protected areas of Mato Grosso. Because the program prioritized enforcement on large 
landholders (FEMA 2001:21), we compare the change of large-scale deforestation 
(deforestation clearings greater 200 hectares) versus small-scale deforestation (clearing below 
200 hectares)8. 
3.5  Data 
The original and derived data sets (digitally coded maps) that are used in the analysis are 
summarized in Table 1. All data is projected to Universal Transversal Mercator (UTM), Zone 
21 South, South American Datum 1969.  
An important variable in our study distinguishes high/low natural vegetation cover. Ideally, we 
would like to distinguish between deforestation potentially consistent with the RL requirement 
versus deforestation on properties that are already out of compliance with the requirement. 
Lacking a map of property boundaries, we constructed a proxy. Using the SEPLAN land cover 
map, the proportion of natural vegetation cover within a radius of about 1,250 meters – an area 
of 625 hectares that corresponds to the mean property size in Mato Grosso (IBGE 1998) – was 
computed for each 100 meter pixel. Based on the biome specific legal reserve requirement, the 
mean natural vegetation cover in non-protected areas in Mato Grosso was classified into areas 
of “high” (in concordance with the RL-definition) and “low” (below the RL-requirement) 
proportion of natural vegetation cover. We defined high versus low cover based on the legal 
reserve requirement of the revised Forest Code 1965, i.e. 35% in the Cerrado, 80% in Amazon 
                                                 
8  Our criterion based on size of incremental clearing corresponds to the criterion of 200 ha incremental deforestation 
size which distinguishes FEMA oversight (large-scale deforestation) from IBAMA oversight (Mato Grosso – 
Ordem Serviçio No. 26/00). However, it differs from the criterion of 300 ha property size which distinguishes 
FEMA oversight (larger properties) from IBAMA oversight (MMA/FEMA Pacto Federativo 2003-2004).  
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(Provisional Measure 2001) and 50% in the Transition biome (Mato Grosso Complementary 
State Law No. 38/1995).9 
Data inconsistencies between FEMA and SEPLAN datasets present a challenge to accurate 
deforestation assessment in Mato Grosso. The deforestation data available to us identified areas 
on which forest cover was lost, but did not identify pre-existing forest cover. The SEPLAN 
land use/ land cover map is based primarily on 1995 satellite imagery with some additional 
images from 1996 and fieldwork conducted in 1997 with updates from 1999 (SEPLAN 2004). 
As the SEPLAN land use/land cover map integrates information from different years, there are 
inconsistencies between the SEPLAN map and FEMA deforestation data. The proportion of 
                                                 
9  The legal reserve requirement was revised since 1996 (Provisional Presidential Decree No. 1.511/96). Prior to 
1996, RL requirement was 50% in forest areas and 20% in the Cerrado (Forest Code 1965).   
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Table 1: Catalog of original and derived data for the analysis  
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FEMA deforestation taking place on areas identified as agricultural in 1995-7 by SEPLAN, is 
25.5% in 1996-97, 19.4% in 1998-99, 13.2% in 2000-01 and 9.5% in 2002. To overcome the 
inconsistencies, we decided to limit the econometric analysis extent to the SEPLAN natural 
vegetation cover, presumably of 1995.10  For describing aggregate deforestation rates, however, 
we use two approaches: 
Relative rate (or forest cover change): FEMA deforestation in period t divided by the 
imputed forest cover (i.e. SEPLAN forest cover in 1995 minus cumulative FEMA deforestation 
since 1995).  
Absolute rate: FEMA reported deforestation in period t divided by invariant land area (i.e. 
regardless of forest cover and therefore constant over time).  
Some further inconsistencies were found in the FEMA deforestation data. For some areas, the 
same area was deforested several times. E.g., although an area was deforested in 1996-97, it was 
deforested again in 1998-99 or 2000-01. Table 2 tabulates areas reporting deforestation in two 
different time periods.  To correct for this data problem, we only considered the deforestation 
at a given point in the first period it was reported.  
Table 2: Duplicate deforestation in the FEMA deforestation data [sqkm] 
3.6  Data sampling 
The analysis was done using data on a sample of land points. The information was derived 
from digital maps using geographic information system (GIS) techniques. Sampling was 
performed by overlaying a 1-kilometer rectangular grid over the state of Mato Grosso, yielding 
                                                 
10  Note that subsequently, we refer to the SEPLAN land use/land cover map as depicting the status of 1995.  
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905,995 sample points. The resulting sample point layer was overlaid on each of the assembled 
digital maps (Table 1) to extract location-specific characteristics for each point (e.g. deforested 
or non-deforested in year x) surrendering categorical variable information. After assessing 
deforestation in protected areas, they were excluded from the subsequent analysis. Water and 
urban points were also excluded, leaving 745,718 sample points for analysis. To reduce spatial 
autocorrelation in the econometric analysis, we created sub-samples from the original set of 
sample points by selecting sets of every ninth point (ie. every third x-coordinate and every third 
y-coordinate). Several combinations of ninth-point samples were extracted using the modulo-
function on the xy-coordinates of the original samples points.  
4  Deforestation trends  
4.7  Deforestation in protected areas 
Before turning to deforestation in private lands, the focus of this study, we briefly assess 
deforestation in protected areas.  For each of the study periods under question we found a 
deforestation rate (with forest cover as the denominator) of less than 0.08% per year within 
protected areas – an order of magnitude lower than the deforestation rate outside protected 
areas.  There was no clear time trend in this already-low rate.  Although we did not examine the 
role of remoteness and soil conditions in explaining the extremely low deforestation rate in 
protected areas, it seems reasonable to suppose that protected area demarcation serves as a 
reasonably effective deterrent to deforestation. 
4.8  Deforestation trends by biome 
We turn now to deforestation rates in non-protected areas.  Relative annual deforestation rates 
refer to the geometric average yearly forest cover change with adjusted SEPLAN natural 
vegetation cover as denominator (Figure 2). Absolute annual deforestation refers to the average 
yearly deforestation rate with total biome land area as denominator (Figure 3).   
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Figure 2: Relative annual deforestation rates 1996-
2002 in Mato Grosso (FEMA 2004) 
Figure 3: Absolute annual deforestation rates  1996-2002 
in Mato Grosso (FEMA 2004) 
 
The gross trends do not show any clear relationship with program implementation. Already 
prior to the FEMA enforcement program, in biennia 1996-97 and 1998-99, absolute and 
relative deforestation rates decline across all biomes. Deforestation rates continue to decrease 
after program implementation in 2000-01, but then start increasing again in 2002 (when FEMA 
began to report single-year observations), especially in the Amazon.  
4.9  Trends inside and outside APPs  
To test for the compliance of the APP requirement, we assessed whether deforestation 
dropped in APPs relative to non-APP areas. Specifically, we compared deforestation change 
within APPs, just outside them, i.e. within a 300 meter buffer extending outwards from the 
APPs, and completely outside of the APPs and their 300 meter buffer before and after 
initialization of the FEMA enforcement program. The comparison was done separately for 
each biome, i.e. for the non-protected biome area, and is depicted in Figure 4-6.  
The most notable feature is the lower deforestation rate within vs outside APPs, at all periods.  
In theory, the comparison between just inside and just outside the APPs should provide some 
insight into the effectiveness of enforcement, both before and after the new system went into 
place.  Since most APP area in Mato Grosso arises from stream proximity rather than 
hillslopes, one would imagine that in the absence of enforcement there would be a higher rate  
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of deforestation inside rather than outside APPs11. So, the observed lower rate may reflect the 
deterrent effect of regulations and enforcement.  The precision of this comparison is however, 
blurred by the possibility of registration errors in overlaying the maps. Note that there is at 
most a slight indication of a post-program change in the differential deforestation rate inside 
versus outside APPs.   
Figure 4: Forest cover change inside/outside APPs in the 
Amazon biome (FEMA 2003) 
Figure 5: Forest cover change inside/outside APPs in 
the Transition biome (FEMA 2003) 
 
 
Figure 6: Forest cover change inside/outside APPs  in the 
Cerrado biome (FEMA 2003) 
 
 
Figure 7 depicts forest cover changes (relative denominator) in large- versus small-scale 
deforestation inside versus outside APPs across biomes. (Large scale deforestation is that 
occurring in deforestation patches of greater than 200 ha in extent.) In and around cerrado 
APPs, large-scale deforestation closely tracks small scale.  But elsewhere, large scale  
                                                 
11  On the other hand, areas suitable for soybean may be situated on flat areas further away from streams.  
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Figure 7: Forest cover change 1996-2002 in deforestation patches smaller/greater 200 hectares inside/outside APP across biomes (Source: FEMA 2003)  
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deforestation appears trend downwards relative to small scale, though not always in absolute 
terms.  The absolute decline in large-scale cerrado deforestation, outside APPs, is noteworthy. 
4.10  Spatial effects related to the RL requirement  
Recall that we use a spatial moving average of high vs. low cover (relative to the biome-specific 
RL requirement12) as a proxy for (unobserved) landholder compliance.  Table 3 depicts the 
absolute and relative distribution of high/low natural vegetation cover per total and per 
forested area across biomes. The proportion of biome with high/low natural vegetation cover 
is depicted in second row (row percentage). The share of high/low natural vegetation cover by 
biome is captured in the third row (column percentage).  
Table 3: Spatial distribution of high/low natural vegetation cover across biomes (own calculations using SEPLAN 
Landcover Map 1995 and RadamBrasil (1972-1980) Vegetation Map) 
 
Figures 8,9, and 10 depict, by biome, the average yearly deforestation rates in high versus low 
cover areas for the periods 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01 and 2002.  
                                                 
12  According to the Medida Provisoria (2001), a legal reserve in the Amazon forest must cover 80% of the 
property area and in the Cerrado biome 35%. According to the Complementary State Law in Mato Grosso 
(1995), a 50% legal reserve requirement is defined for properties in the Transition biome.  See the 
methodology section for the computation of the moving average  
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Figure 8: Deforestation rate in high/low cover  areas of  
he Amazon (FEMA 2003) 
Figure 9: Deforestation rate in high/low cover areas of the 
Transition (FEMA 2003) 
 
 
Figure 10: Deforestation rate in high/low cover areas of 
the Cerrado (FEMA 2003) 
 
 
In the Amazon and cerrado, high cover deforestation rebounds (after a three period decline), 
while deforestation in low-cover areas is approximately static.  This may be a possible signal of 
program impact.  Figure 11 points to a relative decline in large-scale vs. small-scale 
deforestation in low cover areas, but an relative increase in high cover Amazonian areas.  This 
may possibly represent a displacement effect: with greater enforcement in low-cover areas and 
greater scrutiny of large operators, some deforestation activities may have been shifted to high-
cover areas.  Note however, that large-scale deforestation would be expected to decline over 
time in low cover areas, simply because it becomes more and more difficult to find a single 
200+ hectare forest patch.  
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Figure 11: Deforestation rates in high versus low cover areas by biome (FEMA 2003) 
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4.11  Trends in deforestation relative to road proximity 
Enforcement activities are likely to be more vigorous near roads; or landholders may believe 
that road proximity is associated with greater surveillance. Indeed, the Environmental Control 
System’s first year of operations targeted a 60 km corridor around the states’ main roads for 
special attention (FEMA 2001). Hence the program may be associated with a reduction in 
deforestation close to roads relative to deforestation far from roads. To examine this 
hypothesis, forest cover change, separated by size class, was tabulated across road distance 
classes. 
Figure 12: Forest cover change in 0-2 km distance  from 
closest roads (FEMA 2003) 
 
Figure 13: Forest cover change in 2-5 km distance 
from closest roads (FEMA 2003) 
 
 
Figure 14: Forest cover change in 5-10 km distance from 
closest roads (FEMA 2003) 
Figure 15: Forest cover change in greater 10 km 
distance from closest roads (FEMA 2003) 
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There is some suggestion of program impacts on large-scale deforestation. Based on the graphs, 
large-scale deforestation declines more rapidly, especially in 0-2 kilometer road distance, than 
small-scale deforestation. This pattern disappears when moving further than 5 kilometers from 
roads. Again, fragmentation of the forest within 2 km of roads will eventually result in a decline 
of large-patch deforestation relative to small. However, overall near-road deforestation appears 
to decrease relative to deforestation distant from roads. 
4.12  Effects on size of deforestation patches 
The Environmental Control Program explicitly focused on large landholdings. The argument 
was that large-holders contribute relatively more to deforestation in Mato Grosso than small-
holders. Thus we would expect the program to depress large-scale deforestation (i.e. related to 
large individual clearings) relative to small-scale deforestation. Indeed, the proportion of large-
scale deforestation, especially above 1000 hectares, decreased drastically in 2000-01 according 
to FEMA’s statewide figures (Figure 16).13  There was an increase in the proportion of 
deforestation occurring in smaller patches (50-200 has).  This suggests an effect on large-scale 
deforestation which might be connected to the advent of the control system.  But arguably it 
could be connected with changes in the nature or motivation of forest conversion. 
                                                 
13  In Figure 16, the value on each bar expresses the per-cent proportion of deforestation per class of clearing size 
for a given year.  
29
Figure 16: Distribution of mean rate of gross deforestation [%/year] in Mato Grosso by classes of size increment 
from 1996-2002 (FEMA 2004) 
 
4.13  Summary 
In summary, an overview of deforestation patterns suggests that, both before and after the 
implementation of the new control system, deforestation rates were relatively lower in APPs 
and especially in protected areas, as compared to other types of land.  This is an encouraging 
finding, which suggests that even before the introduction of Mato Grosso’s innovative system 
there was some compliance with the most critical aspects of land use regulations.  There is 
striking evidence of a relative decrease in large-scale deforestation after the control system is 
implemented.  There are somewhat ambiguous suggestions of the relative impacts on 
deforestation of legal reserves, and in APPs.  The next section returns to these tests with a 
more powerful statistical apparatus.  
30
5  Statistical analysis of program effectiveness in Mato Grosso  
We now apply multivariate methods to the ‘difference in difference’ tests suggested in section 3.  
Multivariate analysis allows us simultaneously to test the predicted impacts.  It also allows us to 
correct for the change in sample characteristics over time, as forest areas more amenable to 
deforestation are converted.   
We modify equation (1) in two ways.  First, since our data is based on forested points rather 
than areas, we treat y as a latent variable, where we observe deforestation if y>0, and continued 
forest if y≤0.  This permits the equation to be estimated as a logit or probit. Second, we need to 
account for the fact that our final period of observation is a single year, while the other periods 
are each two years in length.  This complicates the interpretation of the coefficient δ, which we 
would like to interpret as a change in the annual deforestation rate.  We adopt two approaches.   
First, we estimate a separate deforestation model for each observation period, eg: 
y*it = Xitβt+ δ tLOWCOVERit+uit 
observe deforestation if y*it>0 
Here our prediction is that δ t , expressed on an annual basis, should decrease in the post-
program years. 
Second, we estimate a multiperiod logit model of the form 
y*it = Xitβt+ Dtγt   +LOWCOVERit(δ0+Dtδt  )+ uit 
[where a category is omitted from each set of dummy variables] 
This implies that: 
ln [(prob deforestation/(1-prob deforestation)]= 
y*it = Xitβt+ Dtγt   +LOWCOVERit(δ0+Dtδt  )+ uit  
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In this formulation, the coefficients γt adjust for the difference in the ln odds of deforestation 
between two-year and one year observation periods.  The coefficients δt  measure the 
differential impact of LOWCOVER (or other variable of interest) in preprogram vs. post 
program years.   
The sample consists only of points having forest cover at the beginning of the observation 
period t, where t is in the set (1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002).  To reduce spatial and 
temporal autocorrelation, we chose a different subsample of the 1 km gridded points for each 
time period, and merged them into a single multiperiod data set. The sample for each time 
period consists of one out of nine of the original sample points, chosen as points on a 3 km by 
3 km grid.   
Table 8 contains the summary statistics of the regressors used in the single-period regressions, 
where deforestation was estimated separately for each observation period; the regressions 
themselves are in Tables 9-12. Instead of coefficients, the tables show ∆F/∆X, the effect of 
each categorical variable X on the probability F of deforestation rate, holding other variables at 
sample means.  For instance, in Table 9, location in high cover areas is associated with a 2.76 
percentage point lower probability of deforestation, other things constant, as compared to low 
cover areas. 
To facilitate a comparison of the single-period estimations, the effects and their statistical 
significance are summarized in Table 13.  (All deforestation rates are true rates, e.g. expressed 
as proportions of the standing forest.)  Specifically, the single-period estimations find: 
(i)  Compared to areas outside the initial enforcement target zones, the probability of 
deforestation within the initial (2000-2001) enforcement target zones was strongly 
significantly higher by 1.04% in 1996-97, significantly higher by 0.40% in 1998-99, 
insignificantly higher by 0.25%, and insignificantly lower by 0.1% in 2002.  In other 
words, areas with high deforestation rates in 1996-99 were designated as priority 
enforcement zones for 2000-01.  After that designation, observed deforestation rates  
32
inside the enforcement zone dropped to the same level as outside the zone (other 
things constant.  This strongly declining differential in deforestation rates is consistent 
with a post-program response to increased (real or perceived) enforcement in the initial 
target zone.  
(ii)  Compared to low cover areas, the probability of deforestation in high cover areas is 
highly significantly lower by 2.76% and 1.87% in 1996-97 and 1998-99, significantly 
lower by 0.98% in 2000-01, yet insignificantly lower by 0.29% in 2002. The declining 
differential of deforestation rates in high and low cover areas is consistent with a post-
program response to increased enforcement of the RL-requirement.  (We stress that 
“response to increased enforcement” is here a shorthand for “a deterrent effect due to 
increased actual or perceived or feared enforcement”. ) 
(iii)  For all periods, there is a very strong and highly significant relationship between 
deforestation road distance. Deforestation rates decrease as distance to roads increases, 
for example areas in more than 10 km from roads have a lower deforestation rate 
between 3.01% in 1996-97 and 1.11% in 2002 compared areas less than 2 km from 
roads.   However, the effect of distance decreases over time.   In 1996-97, the 
deforestation rate is 1.5% lower in the 2-5 km distance bracket, compared to locations 
< 2 km from the road, and this effect is significant at the .00001 level.   By 2002 the 
differential is just 0.2%, and the significance level is 0.2.    The declining differential in 
deforestation rates in areas close vs far from roads is consistent with a post-program 
response to a perceived increase in enforcement near roads.  
(iv)  The interaction effect between low cover and road proximity is not however, fully 
consistent with the hypothesis.   If there was a strong deterrent effect associated with 
the combination of low cover and road proximity, we would expect this interaction 
variable to become more negative after program implementation.  Instead, it is  
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approximately constant over the period 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01, but increases 
(from a well-determined -0.01 to a poorly determined -0.003) in 2002.   
(v)  Compared to areas outside permanent preservation areas (APP), the probability of 
deforestation for both within APPs and just outside them (within a 300 meter buffer) is 
strongly significantly lower across all periods.   However, this differential narrows over 
time, contrary to our hypothesis of relatively increased enforcement or deterrent  in or 
near APPs. 
(vi)  For all periods, a very strong and highly significant relationship between deforestation 
and soil quality. Areas with soil quality rated “no agricultural value” have deforestation 
rates of about 2.1% lower than areas rated “good for annuals and perennials” in 1996-
97.  This differential narrows to about 1.0% in 2002, suggesting some possible 
displacement from more favorable to less favorable areas – possibly consistent with a 
shift by landowners from more observable to less observable deforestation. 
We turn now to the multi-period logit regressions; Table 14 contains summary statistics of the 
regressors used in the estimation of the multi-period logit model and the regression results are 
reported in Table 15. (Table 16 reports the antilog of the coefficients: the impact of each 
variable on the odds in favor of deforestation.) 
The period dummies in this regression control for the difference in the length of the 
observation periods.  Relative to 1996-97, the odds of deforestation were 14% lower in 1998-
99, 6% lower in 2000-01, but 34% lower in the single year period 2002.   Controlling for this, 
we see the hypothesized effect of road proximity and of low cover.  In both cases, these 
variables are not significantly related to a reduction in deforestation in 1998-99 compared to 
1996-97.  But in both cases,  these variables are associated with large and significant  post-
program (2000-1 and 2002) reductions in the odds of deforestation– 40% to 45% reductions in 
the case of road proximity,  25% to 33% in the case of low cover.  The effects of high  
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enforcement are less clearly in accord with the hypothesis.  Before allowing for year-specific 
interactions, deforestation rates are 46% higher in the areas chosen for high enforcement in 
2000-01.  Compared to 1996-97, however, the odds of deforestation in these priority 
enforcement areas dropped by 17% in 1998-99, 20% in 2000-01, and 39% in 2002. 
In general, the multiperiod regression reproduces the main findings of the individual period 
regressions.   Deforestation odds are substantially lower on poor soils, far from roads, on high 
slopes, and in APPs. 
6  Land value and deforestation in Mato Grosso 
Since enforcement against deforestation in Mato Grosso (and elsewhere) appears to have had 
limited success, the question arises whether this is due to the strength of economic pressure for 
deforestation, and whether policies could focus more successfully on deterring deforestation 
that yields only low economic returns. Hence, the objective is to assess the magnitude of 
economic pressure for deforestation in Mato Grosso by looking at regional differences in 
environmental costs (loss of biodiversity and carbon sequestration functionality) versus net 
economic gain (value of land less cost of conversion) from deforestation. This results in two 
hypotheses: 
(i)  land value is closely related to road access, soil quality and rainfall (biome); 
(ii)  deforestation rates are closely related to land values. 
6.14  Statistical analysis of land values and deforestation in Mato Grosso 
To obtain first insight into the hypotheses, mean municipal-level land values for 2003, resulting 
from subjective estimation by INCRA technicians were assembled to be tabulated across road 
distance, soil quality and biome (INCRA 2004). However, municipios exhibit considerable 
internal variation in soil characteristics and road access. INCRA only considers land value  
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variation for some municipalities, notably Cáceres, Campo Verde, Pedra Preta and Primavera 
do Leste, where land in agricultural use is far more valuable than pasture land. In these cases, 
INCRA assigns two values. To adjust for further intra-municipal variation in land value, we 
regressed mean municipal land values on agricultural suitability category, biome and road-
distance category. With the objective to assess the role of land value in private deforestation 
decisions, only sample points of nonprotected areas of Mato Grosso were used (i.e. where 
deforestation can be authorized). Based on the SEPLAN land use information, municipalities 
with two land values became separate observations.
14 We then used the parameters of the 
municipal level regression to impute land values for each sample point.  
In order to spatially impute land values, we assume that plot-level land value is a linear function 
of land characteristics. Then, by linear aggregation, the INCRA mean municipal land value is a 
linear function of the proportion of municipio land with each relevant characteristic. We 
estimated this function by linear regression. Six observations with mean land value above 1700 
Reais/hectare presented outliers in our dataset. These were the agricultural land areas in the 
municipalities of Alto Garças, Alto Taquari, Campo Verde, Itiquira, Pedra Preta and Primavera 
do Leste, all situated in the old agricultural frontier, mainly in south-east Mato Grosso. The 
outliers were extracted and the sample used for estimation was limited to observations with 
mean land value below R$1700/hectare. Table 17 depicts the summary statistics and Table 18 
the outcome of the robust regression model.   A simple exploratory functional form (chosen 
for ease of imputation) found that land values reflect locational rents from road proximity and 
soil quality, confirming the first hypothesis.  For subsequent imputation purposes, the omitted 
observations with INCRA land values greater than R$1700 hectares were left with their original 
land value; we do not believe that these values are in error but rather reflect characteristics we 
are unable to measure.  
                                                 
14  In fact, the municipio-level data set was derived from aggregating point level information. Hence, additional 
municipio observations were created by assigning all points of municipio x in agricultural land (pasture land) 
the INCRA land value for agricultural land (pasture land).   
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6.15  Spatial characteristics of land values in Mato Grosso 
Mean municipal-level land values for 2003, were tabulated across road distance, soil quality and 
biome (INCRA 2004). INCRA land values are based on average land price of regional land 
markets. Thus INCRA values only reflect legal reserve restrictions, if they are also reflected in 
official land prices. We undertook two variants of this tabulation. The unadjusted tabulation 
applies the mean municipal level value to every point within the municipio. Our preferred, 
adjusted tabulation uses the regression coefficients of Table 18 to impute values to each sample 
point within the municipio.  This allows for within-municipio variation in land values due to 
differences in soils and road proximity. This is our preferred measure of land values. 
 To test for the hypotheses, the following tabulations of unadjusted (INCRA) and imputed land 
values across road distance, soil quality (agricultural suitability) and biome is limited to the 
nonprotected areas with natural vegetation cover15 as of 1995 (i.e. according to the SEPLAN 
land use/land cover map 1995, see section 4.5).  
Pattern of land value and road accessibility 
Table 4 contains mean land values per road distance categories for areas with natural vegetation 
cover in 1995. Imputed land values decline with increasing distance from roads.  
 
Table 4: Table: INCRA mean land value per road distance category (INCRA 2003) 
                                                 
15  Recall that “natural vegetation cover” includes, besides forest formations, also Cerrado vegetation formations.   
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Pattern of land value and soil accessibility 
Table 5 depicts the mean land value per soil quality (i.e. agricultural suitability) classes in Mato 
Grosso. Notably, mean land value varies with soil quality, i.e. the more favorable soils are for 
agriculture or pasture, the higher their land value. 
 
Table 5: Table: INCRA mean land value per agricultural suitability classes (INCRA 2003; SEPLAN 1995) 
Pattern of land value and rainfall (biome) 
Table 6 contains the mean land value per rainfall zone (proxied by biome) in Mato Grosso. 
Notably, land values as estimated by INCRA are about one-third lower in the Amazon than in 
the Cerrado; values in the Transition biome are intermediate.  
 
Table 6: INCRA mean land value per biome (INCRA 2003; RadamBrasil 1972-1980) 
6.16  Pattern of land values and deforestation in Mato Grosso 
To obtain further insight into the hypotheses, INCRA land values were tabulated across 
deforested areas in 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01 and 2002 (FEMA 2003) and geographic 
characteristics. The tabulation was restricted to non-protected sample points within the  
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SEPLAN natural vegetation cover was used. These tabulations implicitly assume that there is 
no compliance with the RL requirement. 
Table 7 contains the mean and total land value per road distance categories and deforested 
areas in 1996-2002 in Mato Grosso. This tabulation finds: 
(i)  Most remaining forest and most deforestation is located in “high cover” areas (and 
would presumably be legal if properly permitted). However, deforestation rates are 
higher in “low-cover” areas (presumed illegal) areas although low cover deforestation 
rates decrease, especially in 2000-01. Contrary to expectation, the value of deforested 
land is not much higher in low cover areas (perhaps because remaining forest in these 
heavily exploited areas is on poorer soils), although the difference increases after 2000.  
(ii)  In absolute terms, most deforestation occurs within 2 kilometers of the existing road 
network. Deforestation rates are far higher here than in more remote locations.  And 
land values are much higher.  The causal connections here could be debated – does 
road access confer value, or does high-quality land attract roads?  However, there is a 
clear association between high-value land, road access, and deforestation.   
(iii)  There is a strong association between land quality, land value, and deforestation rates.  
Deforestation rates and land values are highest in the land rated as being best for 
annuals and perennials.  Deforestation rates and land values are the lowest in land rated 
as unsuitable or suitable only for natural pasture.  Land rated as ‘restricted’ for crops has 
low imputed value but rather high deforestation rates.  In 2002, only about 8.6% of 
deforestation took place on these three classes of low-suitability soils, but this 
represented a total of 608 km
2.  
(iv)  In 2002, Amazonian forest had lower land values and a higher deforestation than the 
Cerrado.  (However, effective land values would be higher in the Amazon if RL 
requirements were enforced.)  
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Table 7: Area and imputed land value of deforested land in Mato Grosso (FEMA 2003, INCRA 2003) 
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7  Conclusions 
Against a backdrop of rising aggregate deforestation rates, we have attempted to assess whether 
the SLAPR program altered deforestation behavior, relative to a hypothetical without-program 
baseline. Our results suggest that announcement and early implementation (to 2002) of SLAPR 
affected landholder behavior. Landholders appear to have reduced deforestation in more 
observable areas, areas prioritized for enforcement, and areas with low remaining forest cover, 
relative to other areas.   Although our data do not distinguish legal from illegal deforestation, 
the results are consistent with a reduction in deforestation that contravenes the legal reserve 
regulations.  The results do not necessarily indicate that the program reduced aggregate 
deforestation against the hypothetical baseline. 
 
What accounted for the behavioral change?  In part, it may reflect direct enforcement activities 
by FEMA.  Once landowners are licensed, they face heightened scrutiny by FEMA, and swifter 
and more certain penalties for noncompliance with regulations.  We suspect, however, that 
SLAPR’s deterrent effect was the more powerful influence on landholder behavior.  With the 
transition from a lax enforcement regime to a well-organized and well-publicized one, 
landholders may have perceived an increased likelihood of eventual detection and prosecution 
for illegal deforestation. 
 
Prospects for future program impact depend on the balance between economic pressures for 
deforestation and political will in expanding the scope and effectiveness of SLAPR.  Our 
cursory examination of the economics of deforestation suggests that there are powerful 
economic incentives driving deforestation.  In 2002, deforestation created farmland with an 
imputed gross value on the order of R$300 million. (Net profitability of forest conversion could 
be lower if average clearing costs exceeded average revenues from sale of timber or charcoal.  
On the other hand, in a land-surplus market, land prices may be less than the expected present  
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value of profits.) To put this in perspective, agricultural GDP for Mato Grosso was about 
R$3.3 billion in 2000. 
 
In general, high deforestation rates, and high absolute amounts of deforestation, are associated 
with areas of high market value for land.  This may limit the scope for using economic 
instruments to discourage deforestation of areas with high environmental value but low 
agricultural value.  Nonetheless, some deforestation is taking place in areas with very low land 
values (below US$100/ha).  Here, modest taxes or fees for deforestation might deter forest 
clearance, with significant environmental gains.   Instituting a trade in legal reserve obligations  
(Chomitz 2004; Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão 2004) could have the effect of protecting areas 
far from roads, with current low deforestation rates and land values but at risk of future 
deforestation as the road network expands.   
 
The continued effectiveness of SLAPR depends on its success in expanding coverage to include 
all large landholders, and its success in deterring deforestation on areas not yet enrolled in the 
system.  We have hypothesized that the apparent post-program shift in deforestation patterns 
was due to landholder perceptions of increased probability of law enforcement.  Those 
perceptions – and their effect on landholder behavior – are likely to change as landholders 
observe actual government behavior in detecting and prosecuting illegal deforestation.  In this 
paper we have analyzed deforestation only up to the final year of a state administration widely 
viewed as putting a high priority on environmental issues.  Future work should examine the 
post-2002 evolution of FEMA operations and landholder behavior under a different state 
administration.  As a coda we note that in mid-2005, the director of FEMA was arrested and 
charged with contributing to illegal deforestation – a reminder of the difficulties involved in 
rationalizing land use on the forest frontier.  
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Areas of permanent 
preservation (APP) 
Defined in the Brazilian Forest Code (1965), APPs are strictly protected areas 
along rivers, steep slopes and on hill tops.  
FEMA deforestation  FEMA defines deforestation as the human induced loss of natural vegetation of 
the Amazon, Transition and Cerrado biome. Until 2001, FEMA monitored 
deforestation bi-annually. Since 2002, FEMA monitors deforestation annually. 
To track actual deforestation FEMA uses satellite imagery from the months 
with highest deforestation activity (April-May). 
Legal reserve (RL)  Each private property must preserve a defined share under native vegetation 
cover (i.e. “legal reserve”). The proportion to be conserved depends on the 
biome, in which the property is located and requires 80% in the Amazon, 50% 
in the Transition and 35% in the Cerrado biome. 
High/low natural 
vegetation cover 
To be able to test for compliance of the legal reserve requirement, a proxi for 
“mean natural vegetation cover” was calculated. This was done using a 100 
meter grid of the natural vegetation cover (without any human activity as of 
1995) obtained from the SEPLAN land use/land cover map 1995 and 
calculating for each pixel, the average natural vegetation cover in a 25x25 pixel 
neighborhood, which corresponds to the average property size in Mato Grosso 
of 625 hectares. The resulting mean natural vegetation for an average property 
in Mato Grosso was then, biome specific, classified into “high” (exceeding the 
RL-requirement) and “low” (below the RL-requirement).  
INPE deforestation  INPE defines deforestation as the human induced loss of primary forest in the 
Amazon and Transition forest. With the focus of primary forest, INPE does 
neither consider deforestation of mature secondary growth nor re-growth in 
their measurements (i.e. INPE  measures only gross deforestation). INPE 
monitors deforestation annually, using satellite imagery from in cloud-free 
period (July-September) to monitor deforestation from August to August of the 
following year. 
INPE forest cover  This refers to the spatial delineation of primary forest and is provided with the 
digital deforestation maps from INPE/Projeto PRODES.  
SEPLAN natural 
vegetation cover 
This refers to the natural vegetation cover (i.e. forest and savanna vegetation) as 









Table 9: Probit regression on total deforestation in Mato Grosso 1996-97 
 
Table 10: Probit regression on total deforestation in Mato Grosso 1998-99 
  
47
Table 11: Probit regression on total deforestation in Mato Grosso 2000-01 
 
Table 12: Probit regression on total deforestation in Mato Grosso 2002 
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Table 13: Summary of individual probit regressions for 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01 and 2002 
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Table 16: Logit regression on deforestation  
 
 
Table 17: Summary statistics for variables used in land value regression 
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Map 1: Targeted FEMA enforcement in 2000-01 (FEMA 2002) 
 
Map 2: Deforestation in Mato Grosso from 1996-2002 (FEMA 2003) 
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Map 3: Ecoregions of Mato Grosso (RadamBrasil 1977-1981) 
 
Map 4: Areas of permanent preservation of Mato Grosso (FEMA 2003) 
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Map 5: Protected areas in Mato Grosso (FEMA 2003) 
 
Map 6: Land use/land cover map as of 1995(SEPLAN 2002) 
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Map 7: Natural vegetation cover as of 1995(derived from SEPLAN 2002) 
 
Map 8: High/low natural vegetation cover in Mato Grosso (own calculation) 
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Map 9: Slope in Mato Grosso (derived from USGS 2003) 
 
Map 10: Road proximity in Mato Grosso (derived from FEMA 2003) 
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Map 11: Agricultural suitability in Mato Grosso (SEPLAN 2002) 
 